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ABSTRACT
The continuing expansion of Internet media consumption
has increased traffic volumes, and hence congestion, on ac-
cess links. In response, both mobile and wireline ISPs must
either increase capacity or perform traffic engineering over
existing resources. Unfortunately, provisioning timescales
are long, the process is costly, and single-homing means
operators cannot balance across the last mile. Inspired by
energy and transport networks, we propose demand-side
management of users to reduce the impact caused by con-
sumption patterns out-pacing that of edge network provi-
sion. By directly affecting user behaviour through a range
of incentives, our techniques enable resource management
over shorter timescales than is possible in conventional net-
works. Using survey data from 100 participants we explore
the feasibility of introducing the principles of demand-side
management in today’s networks.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is now dominated by voluminous rich-media
video and audio flows [7]. Delivering these flows is signif-
icantly more expensive for content providers due to strict
constraints on bandwidth. At the same time, the size of rich-
media flows means that a single content provider can over-
whelm an entire access Internet Service Provider (ISP). For
instance, ISPs noted significant increases in costs related to
streaming for BBC iPlayer when it was first launched in the
UK: in just four years, iPlayer rose to 6.4% of all UK In-
ternet traffic. In the US, Netflix streams dominate access
networks, with a 32.9% traffic share during peak hours [16].
These changes mean that Internet traffic, and particularly
the traffic carried by ISPs serving the domestic market, is in-
creasingly dominated by the desires and behaviours of end
users. Unfortunately, while capacity upgrades and provi-
sioning solutions are feasible in the network core, it is far
more expensive to upgrade the geographically-dispersed ac-
cess networks that reach domestic users. Availability of ca-
pacity is an even bigger challenge for mobile environments.
Despite this, the various choices made by these users rarely
surface when considering practical solutions. Instead, the
focus is on lower layers: Traffic peaks are treated as natu-
ral phenomena exhibited through increased packet rates on
network interfaces. This has led to “net neutrality” issues,
whereby ISPs attempt to shape certain types of traffic. How-
ever, to the everyday person, this concept remains opaque,
compounding concerns vocalised by campaigners [1].
As exemplified by this ongoing tussle over net neutrality,
content providers and ISPs each consider the other culpable.
Neither consider that it is the demands of users that is the un-
derlying cause of their problems. Our argument is that, in ad-
dition to managing the effects of user behaviour (i.e., manag-
ing traffic surges and other packet-level phenomenon), ISPs
should also explore ways to alter the cause of these phe-
nomena in the first place, by affecting user behaviour. We
argue this is a positive step and should be encapsulated in a
framework that transparently communicates all forms of po-
tential traffic manipulation to the user. By including users
in this control loop, many novel forms of traffic engineering
become possible; importantly, these can be done with user
consent, rather than in the current opaque fashion.
Thus, this paper proposes that ISPs introduce incentives to
modify user behaviour, shifting users away from undesirable
(peak-time) activity. Although early work (e.g., time depen-
dent pricing [18]) has explored adapting user behaviour, we
make the case for integrating several novel approaches into
a single unified architecture driven by ISP goals. Taking in-
spiration from demand-side management (DSM) techniques
in energy and transport networks, which aim to reduce peak-
to-mean ratios by shifting load, we examine the potential of
proactively adapting user behaviour through a range of tar-
geted incentives (§2). We then propose a simple strawman
architecture, Staggercast, allowing ISPs to incentivise be-
havioural change in pursuit of their own goals (§3). Unlike
existing forms of traffic shaping, we argue that a key focus
should be transparency, allowing users to fully understand
the needs of their ISP. This would offer an effective middle
ground between the two extremes of the net neutrality de-
bate. Specifically, we propose DSM over three dimensions:
(i) time, where users could be encouraged to shift demands
away from peak periods; (ii) space, where users are encour-
aged to utilise certain (lightly loaded) parts of the network;
and (iii) content, where users could be encouraged to con-
sume content with lower network costs. To explore these
ideas we analyse user willingness to engage with Staggercast
ar
X
iv
:1
60
5.
09
47
1v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 31
 M
ay
 20
16
using a questionnaire (§4). We then discuss the relationship
of Staggercast to prior incentive schemes (§5), and conclude
with a discussion of concerns and research challenges (§6).
2. THE CASE FOR DSM
Demand-side management (DSM) is the practice of shap-
ing user behaviour to better satisfy some goal. Although
rudimentary demand pricing has been introduced in some
countries already, this is generally the limit in terms of com-
mercial ISPs. For wireline broadband, indiscriminate “all
you can eat” contracts remain the norm (at least in many de-
veloped countries). Mobile networks are moving in a similar
direction. We begin with two questions: (i) How could spe-
cific user activities be “managed” to better satisfy ISP goals?
and (ii) What incentives could drive users towards accepting
such demand management?
2.1 Internet DSM Techniques
Most user activities affect the network to some extent,
whether the user is sending an email, streaming a video, or
posting a tweet. An ISP could apply DSM to all of these
traffic flows to better satisfy their own objectives, such as re-
ducing transit costs or alleviating the load on certain areas of
the network. Given that the dominant cause of network load
is video, we focus on three types of behavioural change that
involve shifting that specific demand:
(i) Time shifting. An obvious cause of high peak loads
is temporally correlated user activity. In these situations,
DSM could encourage users to change the time that they
use the Internet to reduce the size of these peaks. Al-
though much work exists on time shifting [17], there are
many variations that can be explored. For instance, users
could be asked to pre-fetch content overnight or to tem-
porarily use less heavyweight applications. This would be
particularly beneficial for mobile providers, who could ide-
ally offload traffic onto the wireline network, e.g., by pre-
fetching content in the morning. Less dramatically, ISPs
might dynamically introduce “filler” content (such as adver-
tisements or extended introductions) into streams from lo-
cal sources, effectively staggering requests for content with-
out the users’ knowledge. Although not helpful for heavily
congested edge links, this could certainly help reduce tran-
sit peaks. Offsetting consumption patterns in these ways,
even for live events, might also benefit energy networks by
de-synchronising start, break, and finish times for viewers
(energy providers could perhaps even incentivise ISPs to
achieve this). During popular real-time events, ISPs could
also ask that users delay other tasks (e.g. syncing Dropbox)
until the event has finished.
(ii) Space shifting. In addition to experiencing traffic
surges due to demand that is synchronised in time, ISPs also
experience instances of traffic demand that create network
“hot spots”, i.e., overloaded network links or servers. To
mitigate congestion in these circumstances, DSM could en-
courage users to interact with topologically-distinct regions
of the network. For example, the ISP might ask users to use
augmenting services (e.g., peer-to-peer mechanisms) to al-
low ISPs to redirect and manage web requests. Alternatively,
an ISP might ask a user to prefer services for which the ISP
has more ample provisioning. For example, some services
mirror content across multiple platforms. Based on content
delivery network (CDN) provisions, ISPs might have differ-
ent preferences for which service their users connect to. This
could also occur for individual CDNs, with the ISP express-
ing a preference for which CDN node a client is redirected
to (either by interacting directly with the CDN or, controver-
sially, by manipulating the CDN’s DNS responses).
In more radical settings, future ISPs could also exist
within a far more fluid marketplace where user traffic could
be shifted dynamically between entirely different ISPs on a
minute-by-minute basis. Such an open environment could
allow ISPs and users to negotiate which ISP would handle
each network interaction. In such a case, a user may check
their emails via one ISP, and visit a website via another.
(iii) Content shifting. In some cases, it may be possible
to shift users’ preferences in terms of what they use the In-
ternet for (e.g., which content they consume). For example,
content curation and recommender services could encourage
subscription to “programs like x” as a way of influencing
user choices to become more easily cacheable — using the
“filter bubble” effect to the benefit of the ISP. Such features
could also be used to shape different users towards different
caching infrastructures within the ISP itself (or its peering
points) in an attempt to load balance. When this type of
filtering is applied to large populations of users, these ap-
proaches could have a significant effect on aggregate traf-
fic. In extreme cases, users might even be offered alternative
content (e.g., nearby cached items) at request-time to miti-
gate peak traffic loads. This latter point seems to have strong
potential considering the power of recommendations [5] and
users’ consumption flexibility exhibited for some types of
content [20]. Note that this is quite different to traditional
content manipulation, which is generally limited to bit rate
variations [19]. We argue that in many cases users would
rather watch a different video at a high rate than their “ideal”
video at a low quality.
2.2 User Incentives
All of these forms of shifting require cooperative adapta-
tion of user behaviour. Thus, there is a basic need for ro-
bust incentives that communicate the benefits of behavioural
change to the user. These could, for example, be presented
to the user via a browser plug-in. We consider four of the
many possible models, which are applicable to both mobile
and wireline environments:
(i) Pricing. One well-established way to incentivise be-
havioural change is through pricing. Pricing has typically
been investigated to implement timeshifting strategies [18],
but other activities (e.g., participation in network-friendly
or ISP-local peer-to-peer file-sharing) could also be di-
rectly rewarded with discounts on contracts, or by meter-
ing different traffic types in different ways. More complex
inter-organisation pricing arrangements might also be con-
structed [13, 11]. For example, ISPs with so-called “us-
age caps” might encourage users to adjust their behaviour
by only counting some types of traffic against the usage cap.
This practice is sometimes called unmetering, or zero-rating,
as recently promoted by Facebook. ISPs in countries such as
Australia have already implemented unmetering on a limited
basis for certain content [22]. British Telecom also do this,
allowing unmetred access to the iPlayer video on demand
service from YouView set-top boxes.
An ISP could also reduce prices for other services such
as Netflix, offering (free) prioritised delivery for those
providers in return. Such prioritisation may actually incen-
tivise customers to join the ISP if they frequently use the
prioritised content providers. In markets where users have
a choice between multiple ISPs, dynamic pricing might also
be coupled with flexible switching between ISPs, allowing
users to move between virtual ISPs on shorter timescales.
ISPs might even transparently exchange customers to adapt
to their operating conditions.
(ii) Sociological. Another possible incentive model could
rely on users’ willingness to adapt to achieve wider societal
benefits. For example, a prominent societal concern is the
increasing energy footprint of IT infrastructure. Users’ be-
haviour might be affected by making such impacts explicit
to them while they are using the Internet (e.g., by present-
ing the predicted energy consumption required to refresh a
webpage). Past work has found that communicating network
information to users [2] is actually something appreciated.
This information could be integrated into their browsing ex-
perience (e.g., via a browser plugin) to encourage users to
avoid unnecessary network usage. Many variations of this
notion exist, including making users aware of the conges-
tion they’re creating and its impact on others in the network
neighbourhood. Such features could perhaps even be in-
tegrated into existing social networks to notify users when
their activity impacts their friends.
(iii) Service provisioning. Another reward for be-
havioural change could be through the alteration of service
and network provisioning for cooperative users (our earlier
measurement studies have highlighted that variable service
provisioning is already widely practised, though not always
explicitly). For example, users who timeshift consumption
by an hour might be guaranteed a higher quality of service,
or perhaps ad-free content. Such rewards could become ex-
plicit service offerings, such as the “nighttime data bundles”
that ISPs in certain countries offer [14]. Alternatively, users
could accumulate credits enabling better service provision
in the future. This type of “loyalty reward” has proven ex-
tremely successful in other markets, such as airlines and su-
permarkets.
(iv) Preference shaping. A final alternative would be
to personalise content offerings for individual users by pre-
senting them with different options (e.g., different lists of
content). Recent work [20] found that users in certain do-
mains are often flexible about the content they consume
(and are heavily impacted by browsing order). In these sit-
uations, ISPs could encourage content shifting by present-
ing options to users in different orders; for example, lo-
cally cached content could be placed at the top of a recom-
mendation or search-result list. Such functionality could be
attained by forming a dialogue between content providers
(e.g., YouTube) and ISPs. For example, an ISP could ask
that YouTube adapts its front-page and recommendations for
users from their network by, for example, promoting locally
cached content in recommendations. In return, YouTube
might ask ISPs to prioritise traffic for selected premium con-
tent. In other situations, the ISP might also be the con-
tent provider making this dialogue even easier (e.g., Com-
cast/NBC in the USA is both an ISP and a content provider;
BSkyB in the UK is in a similar position).
Controversially, this approach could allow ISPs to imple-
ment DSM without user awareness (indeed, they may al-
ready be doing so). We argue that, in the spirit of Human-
Data Interaction [12], these practices should be made ex-
plicit in the contracts between ISPs and users, and between
ISPs and content providers. Further, users should be pro-
vided with mechanisms to opt-out at any time. Understand-
ing the broader ramifications of such mechanisms is a rich
area for interdisciplinary research, with computer science,
economics, policy and ethics all having a part to play. What-
ever approach taken, though, we argue strongly that trans-
parency should be a key requirement.
3. STAGGERCAST: DSM FOR ISPS
Realising user behaviour adaptation is challenging. In this
section, we propose a strawman design, Staggercast, named
for its goal of staggering user demand over time, space and
content. Again, we focus on video as a use case because it is
such a significant fraction of Internet traffic.
In Staggercast, network interactions (e.g. a GET request)
falling under DSM would be directed via a DSM Proxy in
an edge network. The remit of this middlebox would be de-
fined by the ISP. For example, if the ISP wishes to manage
Netflix usage, all Netflix traffic would be diverted through
a DSM proxy. The proxy would then apply a DSM rule-
set to decide whether the request should be subject to man-
agement procedures. This decision might be made on many
factors, including (i) current traffic loads; (ii) transit pricing;
(iii) user contract and past behaviour; (iv) download size;
and (v) quality-of-service constraints.
If the proxy decides to perform DSM, the flow will be
routed to the ISP’s DSM Enactor, which would implement
one or more strategies that attempt to modify the users’ be-
haviour. Clearly, these components exhibit synergies with
software defined networking (SDN), offering an existing
platform upon which Staggercast could be built. Based on
the mechanisms discussed in §2, we provide three examples
of how DSM strategies could be realised:
A user’s request could be paused, and a “staging” web-
page returned instead, informing the user of the ISP’s de-
sire to alter their behaviour. A variation of this would be to
ask that users install a daemon or browser plug-in allowing
such information to be conveyed in a more seamless manner.
This has proven effective in related areas of traffic manage-
ment [3]. For example, the webpage or plug-in might ask
the user to to delay their request or install a P2P applica-
tion that matches users with peers within the ISP. Alterna-
tively, it might simply inform the user of the negative impact
their behaviour is having on others. Of course, it would also
communicate any incentives available, i.e., the rewards for
cooperation. The user would then be offered the choice of
adapting their behaviour or continuing as normal.
A user’s request could be transparently adapted or, alter-
natively, the response could be changed without user aware-
ness (assuming prior and continuing consent). For exam-
ple, an HTML response could be re-written to place nearby
cached objects higher up in a browsing order. This would
require deep packet inspection or application-layer proxies.
Alternatively, it could be performed directly by the content
provider via (automated) negotiation with the ISP.
A user’s request could be optimised somehow, e.g., redi-
rected to a nearby cache or alternate provider that is not con-
gested. This is a form of transparent intervention, but would
not directly change user behaviour. It would, however, po-
tentially rely on prior user actions such as the installation of
a P2P application (so that the HTTP request to the site can
be transformed into a P2P one). Hence, in many cases these
strategies must be used in tandem to realise DSM.
Some of these techniques might be progressively deployed
without requiring client-side modification. That said, to bet-
ter enable the above functionality (e.g., automated installa-
tions of software, pre-fetching of content), software could
be embedded within the home access point that could me-
diate interactions between the user and the DSM proxy so
that selected actions could be taken automatically. To re-
duce deployment costs, such software could also be installed
in other nearby locations such as the Broadband Remote Ac-
cess Server. Importantly, by exploiting these SDN-like prin-
ciples, novel strategies could be implemented and dynami-
cally introduced without significant alteration to existing in-
frastructure. As previously stated, all of these mechanisms
must be underpinned by appropriate user consent, posing an
interesting challenge for human-computer interaction.
4. PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION
The key to success in Staggercast is stakeholder coopera-
tion. This is likely the largest hurdle as, generally speaking,
Internet users in the developed world are accustomed to low
cost flat pricing. As a first step in exploring this issue we dis-
tributed a questionnaire via social networks and three techni-
cal research group mailing lists to Internet users asking how
they would deal with having DSM applied to their Internet
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Figure 1: Percentage of respondents who would delay using an Internet
application for over 3 hours
use. We received 100 responses, primarily from the UK and
the USA.1 The respondents were relatively heavy Internet
users: 87% said that they spent in excess of 3 hours online
per day, with 69% saying that the Internet is indispensable
to them. Further, 43% report that they watch online video
more than 3 days a week, suggesting they have heavy traffic
profiles. That said, we wish to emphasise that we do not use
this survey as scientific evidence but, instead, as a mecha-
nism to drive discussion. Our next stage of work would be
to expand this work to involve field trials and ethnography.
4.1 Timeshifting user activity
We asked users if they would be prepared to timeshift In-
ternet usage given one of several incentives. Only 28% said
no, with 70% saying that they would do it either often or
occasionally.2 We further enquired about the applications
they would be prepared to timeshift on. Figure 1 presents
the percentage of respondents who said they would be pre-
pared to timeshift for more than 3 hours (per application). It
can be seen that they feel some applications, such as gam-
ing and video streaming, are quite flexible in terms of when
they are used. In contrast, other applications were consid-
ered less flexible, with only 6% of respondents saying they
would timeshift sending emails for longer than 3 hours, for
example. Broadly speaking, it seems that our respondents
are more flexible about entertainment-oriented applications,
with work-based applications being far less flexible (54%
of people said they would never timeshift remote working).
Importantly, the nature of peak time operation and the rela-
tive weight of usage involved means that you only need to
persuade a small number of customers to timeshift to have
a significant impact (e.g., shifting 5% of traffic can have a
notable calming impact on peaks).
4.2 Incentivising change
1Space constraints restrict further demographic investigation, but
the survey and data are available online, http://www.eecs.qmul.
ac.uk/~tysong/files/staggercast_survey.pdf.
2Note that not all respondents answered all questions, marking
some as N/A.
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Figure 2: Percentage of respondents who stated that an (indpendent) in-
centive would encourage them to delay using Internet applications
Many users in the survey said that their responses would
be based on the particular incentives offered. Thus, we
asked questions about which incentives would drive them
to shift behaviour, shown in Figure 2. The most popular
incentive was guaranteeing the users a high quality of ser-
vice later on, with the second two most popular relating to
pricing: cheaper contracts or discounted extra services such
as Netflix. We were also surprised to see that certain less
conventional incentives were popular with the respondents:
29% said they would be encouraged to change behaviour
if they thought it would be more environmentally friendly.
In fact, one respondent specifically highlighted (in free-text)
that they would not be prepared to engage in any incentives
other than environmental ones. This highlights the need for
personalisation in incentive models.
We also asked the users to propose their own incentive
schemes. In more advanced DSM, this could even be per-
formed as part of a negotiation between customers and net-
work providers (where users petition ISPs for new incen-
tives). Most respondents (76%) did not state anything here
and many actually stipulated that no incentives were appro-
priate, due to the way they use the Internet. One reason given
for this was simply that they perceived the Internet to be
so cheap that it would never be necessary to shift. Some
respondents, however, did propose incentives. One asked
that the shifted traffic did not count towards their data usage,
whereas another thought that superior auditing of their traf-
fic would be sufficient (e.g., offering a breakdown of their
usage, alongside documented benefits they have received).
This raises an interesting side-effect: Any sort of DSM must
be highly transparent, effectively presenting incentives and
implications to the customer (particularly vital considering
ongoing furore surrounding net neutrality issues).
4.3 Video shifting
Network providers often complain of the difficulties in
supporting video in an affordable and scalable way. We
therefore dedicated a section of the survey to people’s will-
ingness to change their video consumption patterns. Our sur-
vey base were heavy video users, with 17% saying that they
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Figure 3: Cumulative percentage of videos for which respondents were
prepared to consider substituting an alternative video
used video on demand everyday and 43% reporting that they
used it more than 3 days a week. 51% of respondents said
they usually sit down with a specific video in mind, making
content shifting difficult. However, the remaining partici-
pants said they were less rigid. 8% of people even said they
usually watch whatever is highlighted on the front page.
We asked if users would be prepared to watch an alterna-
tive video if offered (i.e., content shifting). 30% said never,
56% said occasionally and 6% said often. We asked par-
ticipants what percentage of videos they were prepared to
timeshift and content shift. Figure 3 presents the cumula-
tive number of respondents for each percentage point. Over-
all, it can be seen that our respondents are more willing to
timeshift than content shift. That said, 19% said that they
would be willing to consider watching an alternative for 50%
or more of the videos that they sit down to watch. The key
criteria for watching the alternative listed were how much
the consumer wanted to watch the original video vs. the al-
ternative proposed video. Interestingly, the actual incentive
offered did not appear to be a prominent factor in this deci-
sion with only 8% of people ranking it as highly important.
We were also surprised to see that the respondents were rel-
atively flexible in when they watch their content. 15% said
they would be always prepared to delay watching content,
and only 12% said they would never delay.
Another interesting observation is that their willingness to
content shift varies based on the content genre. For exam-
ple, 44% said that they would be very unlikely to delay the
watching of sport, whereas this was only 19% for movies.
Clearly, such factors must be taken into account when mak-
ing decisions in content shifting. This relates to the person-
alisation of incentives previously mentioned. A per-user ap-
proach must be taken if DSM is to succeed.
Finally, we asked users which incentives would work best
for video-on-demand specifically. The results here were dif-
ferent from the trends discussed earlier. The most popular
incentive was to remove advertisements from video streams
with 52% saying this would encourage them the most to
shift. 30% also said being rewarded with superior video
quality would be acceptable too. This is something that
should be noted by providers, as the usual response to con-
gestion is the downgrading of content quality (via MPEG-
DASH). It seems many users maybe willing to alleviate con-
gestion by delaying consumption instead.
5. RELATEDWORK
Demand-side management has its roots in power net-
works: energy companies have long used differential pricing
to encourage users to shift usage to different times of day,
e.g., the UK energy companies’ Economy 7 tariff. Odlyzko
suggested in the late 1990s that this could be applied to the
Internet [15]. Recently, Prabhakar et al. have applied simi-
lar concepts to road networks, using incentives to encourage
commuters to defer travel to off-peak hours [10].
Staggercast builds on previously proposed notions of
bandwidth sharing and time-shifting traffic demands. Re-
searchers have so far focussed on various forms of time-
dependent pricing [17]. Chhabra et al. proposed using in-
centives based on existing flat-rate schemes that allow homes
to select a portion of their peak utilisation and move it to off-
peak hours; they focus on shifting delay-tolerant traffic (e.g.,
peer-to-peer) in exchange for higher download rates during
off-peak hours [4, 8]. The Trade and Cap system offers an
incentive mechanism for allowing users to trade bandwidth
allocations at a shared link [9]; the INDEX project studied
how home network users adjust usage in response to dif-
ferent pricing structures [21]. Other work has focused on
pricing schemes for shifting mobile traffic [6], as well as for
cloud resources [23]. We argue that this work is too narrow
in scope, relying on pricing schemes to mediate resources.
Hence, we build on this work by introducing new shifting
types (content and space), alongside moving the focus away
from price-based incentives and towards more sophisticated
incentive mechanisms. Our key goal has therefore been to
offer a generalised and extensible framework that can be
used by ISPs to encompass all these forms of incentive-
driven behavioural changes. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to propose such a framework.
6. CONCLUSION AND AGENDA
The continuing growth in demand for online content from
home access networks threatens to outpace the capacity pro-
visioned at the edge, particularly as users increasingly re-
quest “over the top” video streaming during peak hours. Al-
though ISPs could handle this increasing load by provision-
ing extra capacity, doing so in the access network remains
expensive and cannot adapt sufficiently quickly to respond
to rapidly shifting demands. In this paper, we have proposed
an architecture for Internet Demand-Side Management. We
have outlined several techniques that ISPs might employ to
“manage” the behaviour of users, and a preliminary architec-
ture, Staggercast, which could implement these strategies.
There are many avenues of exploration remaining. Im-
plementing and deploying Staggercast in a realistic setting
is an important challenge. Such a system must determine
which traffic demands should be shifted and what incentives
should be offered to which users to shift demand appropri-
ately. Hence, the coupling of caching/storage decisions and
the use of incentives to affect user behaviour is a ripe area
for further explanation. Effective DSM also requires a better
understanding of the effectiveness of incentives on user be-
haviour through deployment and user studies. In particular,
we must determine how different users respond to different
incentives, measuring elasticity of traffic demand in practice.
In the case of video shifting, there is also research to be done
in predicting which alternate videos might be acceptable to
a given user, and under what incentive.
The architecture also potentially creates new markets to
design, explore, and study. For instance, ISPs might sell
storage space at the edge to content providers, who can then
encourage users to shift content viewing patterns to make
more effective use of caching, e.g., reducing advertising in
free content, or offering paid content at a lower price. Un-
doubtedly, our proposal raises many questions and gives
rise to potential concerns regarding net neutrality, particu-
larly when considering strategies involving content shifting
and manipulation of recommendations to affect demand. In
some cases, the user might even be completely unaware that
they are participating in DSM, which also raises legal and
ethical questions relating to disclosure.
Staggercast must therefore take a position in the debate;
some may argue that this position is against net neutral-
ity. However, Staggercast aims at enabling greater trans-
parency and flexibility in the relationship between ISPs, con-
tent providers and consumers. In any case, unless regulation
is enacted to prevent such behaviours, it appears such trends
are inevitable, making it imperative that we explore more
flexible ways to manage content and traffic, lest we miss an
opportunity to improve network efficiency. In some cases,
users may, in fact, benefit by paying for (and receiving com-
pensation for) services that more accurately reflect the value
of delivering bits over the network. Ultimately, by making
the costs of delivering content more transparent through flex-
ible incentives, the efficiency of network markets may im-
prove. As one example, ISPs well-provisioned enough to
have excess capacity at peak times might encourage their
users to make content requests. Such excess capacity could
be used to fill local caches, which users of other ISPs could
pay to access (e.g., by creating a “spot market” for caches).
Thus, in addition relieving peak-time congestion, bandwidth
scarcity in the access network can be turned into a source of
profit for both access ISPs and users.
We acknowledge that such an approach is inherently risky:
it puts network neutrality to the test; it has considerable secu-
rity, privacy, and ethical implications; and users themselves
may not participate in the incentive mechanisms if the they
are not made sufficiently transparent and easy to understand.
Yet, we believe that these challenges – and the potential posi-
tive benefits of a successful DSM architecture – are precisely
what makes this research area worth exploring further.
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